Dr. Ondřej Rosendorf

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter
Kontakt
+49 40 86 60 77-34
rosendorf@ifsh.de
Hamburg

Zeitschriftenaufsätze

  • Smetana, Michal, Marek Vranka, Ondřej Rosendorf. 2025. Public Support for Arms Control in the Third Nuclear Age: Cross-National Survey and Elite Cues Experiment in NATO Countries. European Journal of International Relations DOI: 10.1177/13540661251353107.
  • Smetana, Michal, Marek Vranka, Ondřej Rosendorf. 2024. Elite-Public Gaps in Support for Nuclear and Chemical Strikes: New Evidence from a Survey of British Parliamentarians and Citizens. Research & Politics 11 (3) DOI: 10.1177/20531680241276795.
  • Rosendorf, Ondřej, Michal Smetana, Marek Vranka. 2023. Algorithmic Aversion? Experimental Evidence on the Elasticity of Public Attitudes to “Killer Robots”. Security Studies 33 (1): 115-145. DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2250259.
  • Rosendorf, Ondřej. 2023. Alliance Complements or Substitutes? Explaining Bilateral Intergovernmental Strategic Partnership Ties. Czech Journal of International Relations 58 (3): 7-41. DOI: 10.32422/cjir.59.
  • Smetana, Michal, Marek Vranka, Ondřej Rosendorf. 2023. The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats. Journal of Experimental Political Science DOI: 10.1017/XPS.2023.8.
  • Rosendorf, Ondřej, Michal Smetana, Marek Vranka. 2022. Autonomous Weapons and Ethical Judgments: Experimental Evidence on Attitudes Toward the Military Use of “Killer Robots”. Peace and Conflict 28 (2): 177-183. DOI: 10.1037/pac0000601.
  • Smetana, Michal, Marek Vranka, Ondřej Rosendorf. 2022. The Lesser Evil? Experimental Evidence on the Strength of Nuclear and Chemical Weapon “Taboos”. Conflict Management and Peace Science 40 (1): 3-21. DOI: 10.1177/07388942221124515.
  • Rosendorf, Ondřej, Michal Smetana, Marek Vranka. 2021. Disarming Arguments: Public Opinion and Nuclear Abolition. Survival 63 (6): 183-200. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2021.2006454.
  • Rosendorf, Ondřej. 2021. Predictors of Support for a Ban on Killer Robots: Preventive Arms Control as an Anticipatory Response to Military Innovation. Contemporary Security Policy 42 (1): 30-52. DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2020.1845935.
zurück zum Profil